Jurisdictional Remix: The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Presents New Challenges to Federal Litigation by Alvine, Elizabeth L.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 89 Number 1 Article 6 
1-1-2013 
Jurisdictional Remix: The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act Presents New Challenges to Federal Litigation 
Elizabeth L. Alvine 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alvine, Elizabeth L. (2013) "Jurisdictional Remix: The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification 
Act Presents New Challenges to Federal Litigation," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 89 : No. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol89/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
            
 
 
JURISDICTIONAL REMIX:  THE FEDERAL COURTS 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT 
PRESENTS NEW CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL LITIGATION 
ABSTRACT 
 
In response to a growing concern about the efficiency and clarity of 
jurisdiction in the federal judicial code, Congress passed the Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act (“JVCA”) on November 30, 2011.  
The JVCA is the most far-reaching package of revisions to the judicial code 
since the Jurisdictional Improvements Act of 1990.  Although the JVCA 
affects almost every aspect of federal jurisdiction, the majority of the 
amendments focus primarily on removal and venue.  The new amendments 
resolve circuit splits, carve out new exceptions, and codify judicially 
created rules to “bring more clarity to the operation of Federal jurisdictional 
statutes and facilitate the identification of the appropriate State or Federal 
court where actions should be brought.”  While the stated purpose of the 
JVCA is to bring guidelines and clarity to often confusing jurisdictional 
issues, there is concern the JVCA will create new challenges and confusion 
for future federal litigants.  This Note will examine the new jurisdictional 
amendments created by the JVCA, and will argue the JVCA was intended 
to clarify jurisdiction, but the JVCA may present future federal litigants 
with more questions than answers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 7, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law one of 
the most expansive pieces of legislation affecting the United States judicial 
code since the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.1  The Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 20112 (“JVCA”), was passed in 
response to an increased demand for clarification of federal jurisdiction.  
Although the JVCA affects almost every aspect of federal jurisdiction, the 
majority of the amendments focus primarily on removal and venue.  The 
new amendments resolve circuit splits, carve out new exceptions, and 
codify judicially created rules to “bring more clarity to the operation of 
Federal jurisdictional statutes and facilitate the identification of the 
appropriate State or Federal court where actions should be brought.”3  
 
1. Arthur Hellman, The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act is Now 
Law, JURIST (Dec. 30, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/arthur-hellman-jvca.php. 
2. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 
§103(b)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 758 (enacted Dec. 7, 2011). 
3. H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 1-2 (2011). 
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While the stated purpose of the JVCA is to bring guidelines and clarity to 
often confusing jurisdictional issues, there is concern the JVCA will create 
new challenges and confusion for future federal litigants. 
This Note will explore the JVCA in depth and discuss how the new 
amendments may impact federal litigants.  Specifically, Part II will address 
the lengthy and complex legislative history of the JVCA, including the 
development of the bill and its passage through Congress.  Part III will 
address the key amendments of the JVCA, including timely removal, 
amount in controversy, and venue clarification.  Finally, Part IV will 
discuss the challenges presented by these new provisions, and the new 
strategy concerns the JVCA presents for federal litigators. 
II. A CALL FOR CLARITY IN FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
In the 1990s, the Judicial Conference Committee on Federal-State 
jurisdiction began to identify recurring problems encountered by litigants 
and judges.4  The Judicial Conference Committee consulted with law 
professors, the American Law Institute (“ALI”), and the legal community to 
hone in on the particular areas of jurisdiction that required clarification.5  In 
particular, judges raised concerns about the increasing confusion they faced 
when applying certain jurisdiction and venue statutes.6 
A. JURISDICTION AND EFFICIENCY 
Judges, law professors, and the ALI raised concerns on the vagueness 
and confusing procedural limitations of the federal judicial code.7  As a 
result, several jurisdictional issues, including defendant removal and venue, 
were resolved differently across the Circuit Courts of Appeals.8  A specific 
example of this confusion surrounded the singular use of “the defendant” in 
former 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); nothing in the legislative history discussed the 
significance of the singular use of “the defendant,” but the ambiguity gave 
rise to a split in interpretation by the federal circuit courts.9 
 





7. Paul E. Lund, The Timeliness of Removal and Multiple-Defendant Lawsuits, 64 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 50, 64 (2012). 
8. Id. at 52. 
9. Id. at 60. 
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In the spirit of addressing the issue of efficiency and clarity, the ALI 
began the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project.10  Finalized in 2001, the 
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project was one of the primary influences 
on the JVCA and spurred the discussion for drafting the JVCA.11  Around 
2001, the federal Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction began its own 
initiative “to ascertain amendments for judicial improvements.”12 
B. A PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE:  THE JURISDICTION  
AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT 
Charged with legislating a response to the growing concerns with 
federal court jurisdiction and efficiency, the Committee on Federal-State 
Jurisdiction began drafting several proposals for consideration.13  
Ultimately, the Committee recommended seven specific amendments to 
Title 28 “to improve the clarity of the law and increase judicial 
efficiency.”14 
1. Preliminary Legislation by the Committee on Federal-
State Jurisdiction 
One of the seven initial proposals related to citizenship of insurers in 
direct-action litigation.15  The remaining six proposals related to removal 
and remand procedures.16  In addition to a last-served defendant proposal, 
to resolve the circuit spilt discussed above, these proposals included: (1) 
how to address removal issues in diversity cases when the amount in 
controversy was unclear; (2) authorizing federal district courts to waive the 
one-year limit on removal in some circumstances; (3) clarified 28 U.S.C. 
§1441(c) regarding the removal and remand of cases containing both 
federal-law claims and unrelated state-law claims; (4) separating the 
removal provisions for criminal and civil cases into two statutes; and (5) 
removal of the specific reference to Rule 11 in 28 U.S.C. §1446(a).17 
In 2005, the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on these 
 
10. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Federal Judicial Code Revision Project (2001), 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=78. 
11. Id. 
12. Lund, supra note 7, at 98 (quoting AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION 
PROJECT § 1446(b)(1), 459 (2004)). 
13. Id. at 99. 
14. Id. at 98-99 (quoting Judicial Conference Report, Sept. 23, 2003, at 22-23). 
15. See Judicial Conference Report, Sept. 23, 2003, at 22-23. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
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proposals.18  Subcommittee Chair Lamar Smith of Texas stated that these 
proposals would have “a wide impact on ordinary private litigations in the 
federal courts.”19  Smith also noted, “our job is not to favor plaintiffs or 
defendants, but to make sure that the jurisdiction arrangements are both fair 
and efficient for all litigants.”20 
2. Consultation with Legal Stakeholders 
While Chairman Smith and the subcommittee considered these 
proposals, several legal scholars consulted and testified to the project during 
the 111th Congress.  Scholars from law schools such as the University of 
Houston, Chicago-Kent, Loyola, and Duke endorsed the changes.21  
Professor Arthur Hellman of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
testified before the Subcommittee and contributed significantly to the 
project.22 
Other legal stakeholders were also consulted during the drafting of the 
JVCA.  The American Bar Association and the American Association for 
Justice spoke to the amount in controversy requirements, removal, and 
transfer of venue provisions.23  Lawyers for Civil Justice and the Federal 
Bar Association also pledged general support for the bill.24  Most 
importantly, this informal vetting process with legal stakeholders allowed 
the JVCA to mark up the bill, increasing the likelihood the JVCA could be 
passed by both the House and the Senate. 
3. Congressional Candor and Bargaining 
In 2006, the bill was introduced containing the proposals by the 
Subcommittee;25 however, the bill was not reported out of committee.26  
The bill did not reappear until November 2009.27  It returned as House Bill 
4113, entitled the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act 
in the 111th Congress.28 
 
18. Lund, supra note 7, at 99. 
19. Id. 
20. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction Clarification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Nov. 15, 
2005) (statement of Rep. Smith, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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The House passed the bill by voice vote on September 28, 2010.29  
Upon review by the Senate Judiciary Committee, some minor amendments 
were made to the House version of the bill.30  One of the more controversial 
strikes made by the Senate was to maintain the status quo on derivative 
jurisdiction.31  Prior to 1986, the derivative jurisdiction doctrine meant that 
if a state court lacked jurisdiction over an exclusively federal matter, 
removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f) was nonetheless barred 
because the Unites States district court’s jurisdiction was not “derivative” 
of the jurisdiction that attached in state court.32  The Department of Justice 
attorneys said that although it is infrequently used, they sometimes invoke 
the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction when suits involving federal officers 
and agencies are removed to federal court.33 
4. Passage of the JVCA 
With the Senate changes, the bill was reintroduced in January 2011 as 
House Bill 394.34  The bill quickly passed the House, unanimously 
supported on February 28, 2011.35  The final version of the JVCA passed 
the Senate on November 30, 2011, and was signed by President Obama on 
December 7, 2011.36 
III. REMOVAL AND VENUE:  THE KEY AMENDMENTS 
After taking six years to pass through Congress, the JVCA was a 
significant accomplishment for the House Judiciary Committee and the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.  The JVCA included 
several amendments to Title 28 of the judicial code.37  The most significant 
amendments for federal litigants are:  (1) timely removal for multiple 
defendants; (2) amount in controversy requirements; and (3) clarification of 




31. H.R. REP., supra note 3. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, H.R. 394, 112th Cong. 
(as introduced in House, Jan. 24, 2011). 
35. Lund, supra note 7, at 102. 
36. Id. 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2011). 
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A. TIMELY REMOVAL FOR MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS 
The United States Constitution makes no explicit reference to removal 
of cases from state to federal court; however, ever since the federal courts 
were first created, Congress has provided for removal.38  The theory 
underlying removal is that when a case properly falls within the federal 
courts’ limited jurisdiction, the defendant should have the opportunity to 
consider the benefits of federal jurisdiction, as the plaintiff(s) had the first 
opportunity to determine where to file suit.39 
Usually, the statutory right to remove exists when the plaintiff(s) could 
have brought their suit in federal court.40  The suit is one that would have 
fallen within the original jurisdiction of the federal court, but the plaintiff 
chose to file in state court instead.  This normally involves cases where the 
plaintiffs have asserted claims that arise under federal law or diversity of 
citizenship exists between plaintiffs and defendants.41 
Removal remains a major point of controversy for several reasons. 
First, removal disrupts the usual rule that the plaintiff gets to choose the 
forum in which the plaintiff’s claims will be heard.42  Second, removal 
involves taking a case from the state court’s hands even though the state 
court had entirely proper jurisdiction over the case.43 Third, removal creates 
the potential of upsetting the state court’s proceedings after the court has 
devoted substantial time and attention to the case.44 
1. The Problem:  A Circuit Spilt on Section 1446(b) and Removal 
for Multiple Defendants 
Prior to the enactment of the JCVA, the time limitation on removal for 
cases involving multiple defendants was a significant procedural limitation.  
The limitation, before the recent amendment was found in the first 
paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b): 
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed 
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through 
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth 
the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, 
or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the 
 
38. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §5.5, at 354 (5th ed. 2007) 
(discussing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80). 
39. Lund, supra note 7, at 56. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 58. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
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defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is 
not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is 
shorter.45 
Former section 1446(b) was the only removal statute to refer to the 
defendant in the singular.46  The statute was simple enough to apply when 
all defendants were served on the same date, but ambiguity arose in the 
common situation of service on different dates.  It is this ambiguity that had 
given rise to a split among the circuit courts.47 
Because of the reference to the defendant in the singular, three different 
circuit court approaches were developed.48  First, the most stringent 
interpretation was the Fifth Circuit’s “first-served” defendant rule.49  This 
rule requires all defendants who have been served at that point to file or join 
in a removal notice within thirty days of service on the first defendant.50  
Second, several circuits, concerned about the possibility of “inequitable 
results” with the first-served defendant rule, adopted the “last-served” 
defendant rule.51  Under this rule, removal is timely as long as the removal 
notice is filed and joined in by all defendants within thirty days of service 
on the last-served defendant.52 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit adopted an “intermediate” rule between the 
two, polar-opposite rules in the other circuits.53  The Fourth Circuit’s 
approach bears some resemblance to the first-served defendant rule, in that 
it requires that a notice of removal be filed within thirty days of service on 
the first-served defendant.54  If the first-served defendant does not file a 
notice, the case cannot be removed.55  However, the intermediate rule does 
provide some relief to later-served defendants.56  If a timely notice of 
removal has been filed by the first-served defendant, the subsequently 
served defendants do not need to join with notice within the initial thirty-
day period; instead, each defendant has thirty days from the date of service 
to file its own notice of removal or join in a previously filed notice.57 
 
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). 
46. Howard B. Stravitz, Re-cocking the Removal Trigger, 53 S.C. L. REV. 185, 200 (2002). 
47. Id. 
48. Lund, supra note 7, at 64. 
49. Id. at 64-65. 
50. Id. at 65. 
51. Id. at 69-70. 
52. Id. at 69. 
53. See McKinney v. Board of Trustees, 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992).  
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2. The Solution:  The Last-Served Defendant Rule 
The JVCA specifically addresses this conflict among the circuit courts.  
First, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) previously consisted of two, unnumbered 
paragraphs. The JVCA preserves the current language of the first paragraph 
as new subsection (b)(1).58  The language previously found in the second 
paragraph of section 1446(b), with some changes, has been renumbered as 
subsection (b)(3);59 the new subsection will govern the timing of removal of 
cases that are not removable as originally filed but become removable later.  
Between those two subsections, an entirely new subsection (b)(2) has been 
added to address multiple-defendant cases.60 
Second, the JVCA expressly adopts the last-served defendant rule.61  If 
any defendant elects to file a notice of removal, the previously served 
defendants can join, even if they previously made a conscious decision not 
to seek removal.62  Finally, the JVCA purports that the last-served 
defendant rule is necessitated by considerations of “[f]airness to later-
served defendants” and that it would “not allow an indefinite period for 
removal.”63  The question remains, however, whether these revisions have 
actually resulted in more ambiguity and inefficiency. 
B. AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY 
From the earliest days of the federal courts, there has been a statutory 
requirement applicable to some cases that a certain amount is in controversy 
in order to bring an action in the federal district courts.  In most diversity 
cases, the amount in controversy is governed by the more than $75,000 
requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.64  The problem often encountered by 
federal judges and litigants is how to calculate the proper amount in 
controversy because the rules for measurement are complex.  Additionally, 
federal courts take various views and opinions on how to calculate the 
amount in controversy.65 
 
58. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 
103(b)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 758 (enacted Dec. 7, 2011). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 13-14. 
62. Id. at 14. 
63. Id. 
64. 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3701 (4th ed. 2011). 
65. Id. 
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1. The Problem:  Mixed Calculations 
Mississippi Railroad Company v. Ward66 is the leading United State 
Supreme Court precedent supporting the plaintiff-viewpoint rule.67  The 
plaintiff-viewpoint rule can be warranted in terms of the long-standing 
principle that the burden of establishing the subject matter jurisdiction of a 
federal court is on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must do so in the 
complaint.68  Testing the adequacy of the amount in controversy from the 
perspective of the plaintiff’s viewpoint can be efficient and can promote a 
straight-forward approach in terms of deciding the jurisdictional amount 
question. 
However, cases are never this clear and simple, particularly when 
assessing damages.69 A significant number of other lower federal courts, on 
the other hand, have found that jurisdiction exists if more than the statutory 
amount is involved from the viewpoint of either the plaintiff or the 
defendant.70  There is also a third viewpoint on the amount in controversy 
calculation, supported by several district court decisions and a dictum by 
one court of appeals.71  These cases view the amount in controversy from 
the point of view of the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, and as 
such, would look to the plaintiff’s viewpoint in a case within the federal 
courts’ original jurisdiction, and to the defendant’s viewpoint in a case 
brought to the federal courts by way of removal from a state court.72 
2. The Solution:  Defining the Equation 
Because of these various interpretations of how to calculate the amount 
in controversy, one of the amendments included in the JVCA directly 
addressed this issue.  28 U.S.C. § 1446 was amended by the JVCA by 
adding new sections related to the calculation of the amount in controversy 
when local statutes do not require or allow the plaintiff to allege damages 
 
66. 67 U.S. 485 (1862). 




71. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) (dictum), Sasenbury v. 
Barnes-Jewish Hosp., 2010 WL 1912913, *2 (S.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Smart v. Local Int’l 
Brotherhood of Elect. Workers, 562 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2009)).  “When a defendant removes 
an action where a plaintiff had sought to recover some ‘unspecified amount that is not self-
evidently greater or less than the federal amount-in-controversy requirement,’ the Sixth Circuit 
has held that the removing defendant must show that the action ‘more likely than not’ satisfies the 
$75,000 requirement.” Cleveland Housing Renewal Project v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 606 F. 
Supp. 2d 698, 710 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (quoting Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th 
Cir. 1993)). 
72. Id. 
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over a threshold amount.73  The new 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2) allows a 
defendant, in the notice of removal, to assert that the actual or true amount 
in controversy exceeds $75,000, even if the plaintiff’s pleadings are silent 
on the issue.74  If the district judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum, federal 
court jurisdiction will apply.75  In addition, under 28 U.S.C. § 
1446(c)(3)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), if a defendant later finds that the 
amount in controversy is greater than $75,000 because of discovery or an 
amended pleading, a new thirty day window for removal will open.76  The 
result is a hybrid approach between the current methods of calculations for 
amount in controversy. 
The legislative history encourages looking to McPhail v. Deere & 
Company,77 and Meridian Security Insurance Company v. Sadowski,78 for 
the appropriate application of what must be pled or alleged in order to reach 
the jurisdictional threshold.  In addition, removal to federal court can 
happen more than one year after the action was filed if the plaintiff acted in 
bad faith by attempting to disguise the true amount of damages claimed.79 
The new amount in controversy requirements allows the defendant to 
assert his own assessment of the amount in controversy only if state 
practice “does not permit demand for a specific sum or permits recovery of 
damages in excess of the amount demanded.”80  When state law is 
permissive, and the plaintiff does not name a dollar figure, neither provision 
is triggered: state law does “permit” specific demands, and there is no 
“amount demanded.”81  Unfortunately, there are many states whose practice 
falls into this category. 
The defendant is permitted to assert his own amount in controversy, 
and the statute adopts a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.82  Some 
courts treat the preponderance standard as if it articulated a presumption of 
narrow construction against removal jurisdiction.83 McPhail and Meridian 
 
73. William Baude, Clarification Needed:  Fixing the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification 
Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 34 (2012). 
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)-(c) (2011). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. 529 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2008). 
78. 411 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2006). 
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(B) (2011). 
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2011) (emphasis added). 
81. Id. 
82. Baude, supra note 73, at 35. 
83. See, e.g., Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 F. App'x 62, 65 (5th Cir. 2010), 
Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Meridian v. Sadowski, 441 
F.3d 536, 542 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting other district courts that had imposed such a burden). 
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analyzed that view, and instead interpreted the standard to apply only to 
“contested facts” that might be relevant to the amount in controversy, 
whereas “once those underlying facts are proven, a defendant . . . is entitled 
to stay in federal court unless it is ‘legally certain’ that less than $75,000 is 
at stake.”84  The Committee Report does suggest the bill was intended to 
codify the rule in McPhail and Meridian, but that intention is expressed 
only in the Committee Report.85 
C. CLARIFYING VENUE 
The JVCA also addressed issues of venue.  Venue refers to location; 
the place where a lawsuit should be filed and heard according to the 
applicable statutes or rules.86 As courts have observed, the fundamental 
aspect of venue is “primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum.”87  
The principal focus of a venue inquiry is the “convenience of litigants and 
witnesses,” although it is more concerned with the litigant who has not 
chosen the forum than with the litigant who has chosen the forum.88 
1. The Problem:  Where Do Claims Belong? 
Although venue may appear to be one of the more clear topics in 
federal jurisdiction, it is one of the more complex portions of the federal 
judicial code.  The word “convenience” alone is enough to muddy the 
jurisdictional waters on venue.  Other problems arise with fraudulent 
joinder and forum shopping among parties.89 
While complex, venue is also an absolutely critical aspect of litigation.  
Venue can have a major impact on court costs, time to trial, and the 
attitudes of the judge handling the case.90  As such, venue is a crucial 
component in federal cases. 
Prior to 1990, venue for certain civil claims was permitted in the 
primary judicial district in which the claim arose.91  This language created 
difficulties for the lower federal courts because they struggled with exactly 
how to establish the single judicial district in which the claim arose.92  With 
 
84. McPhail, 529 F.3d at 954; accord Meridian, 441 F.3d at 543. 
85. Baude, supra note 73, at 36. 




90. Li Zhu, Taking Off: Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation in the Rocket 
Docket, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 901, 904 (2010). 
91. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 64, § 3804. 
92. Mitchell G. Page, After the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990:  Does the General Venue 
Statute Survive as a Protection for Defendants?, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2003). 
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the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, however, the general venue statute 
was amended to authorize venue in any district in which a “substantial part 
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”93  In drafting 
this amendment to the federal venue statute, Congress meant to eliminate 
“wasteful litigation” concomitant with ascertaining the single district “in 
which the claim arose.”94 
Notwithstanding the intent of Congress to curtail litigation over venue, 
the 1990 Act truncated the ability of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 to protect a 
defendant from having to defend a claim brought in an unfair or 
inconvenient district.95  As a result of the 1990 Act, Congress created a 
situation where plaintiffs in diversity cases used the amended language of 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) to influence the law applied to resolve their claim.96  
This consequence went beyond Congress’ stated intent of trying to decrease 
litigation over venue.97  Moreover, this result also ran against the general 
judicial doctrine and statutory provisions that seek to discourage forum 
shopping for the ideal court to try a case.98 
2. The Solution:  A Unitary Approach 
One of the more significant amendments by the JVCA included 
changing the general definition of venue to help clarify some of the 
confusion created by the 1990 Act.99  In the revised 28 U.S.C. § 1390(a), 
venue now distinguishes the geographic specification of the appropriate 
forum from other federal law provisions, which restrict subject-matter 
jurisdiction.100 
The amendment also abolished the distinction in venue between “local” 
and “transitory” actions.101  The local action rule had limited certain kinds 
of actions involving real property to the district where the property was 
located.  This created problems in quarrels over property suits if a court 
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the place 
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clarify that only subject matter and personal jurisdiction restrictions apply 
and repeals 28 U.S.C. § 1392.103 
The JVCA amendments were also designed to eliminate the distinction 
between diversity and federal question action venue to a “unitary” 
approach.104  It establishes, regardless of how subject-matter jurisdiction is 
obtained, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as the general venue statute.  Venue is based on 
residence of the defendant, and fallback venue can be used if there is no 
other district in which the case may be brought.105 
The new fallback provision directs that venue for both diversity and 
federal question matters fall on the district “in which any defendant is 
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.”106  
The new subsection of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) also clarifies that “resides” 
should have the same meaning as domicile, and a natural person is deemed 
to reside in the judicial district where they are domiciled.107  Additionally, 
the JVCA allows for transfer of venue to any district, with the consent of all 
parties.108  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) had previously only permitted transfer to a 
venue where the action could be brought; those types of transfers are 
possible when all parties agree and the court determines it is for the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.109 
IV. CLARIFYING THE CLARIFICATION:  NEW CONCERNS FOR 
FEDERAL LITIGANTS 
Although the JVCA was passed by Congress to address the growing 
confusion and frustration with parts of the federal judicial code, the 
question remains as to whether the JVCA actually provides clarification to 
federal judges and litigants.  There is also concern the JVCA will create 
new ambiguities and questions in the federal judicial code.  Omitted 
provisions, ambiguity, and new strategy issues are only a handful of the 
concerns raised by the JVCA. 
A. PLAYING POLITICS:  OMITTED PROVISIONS 
As referenced earlier, when the JVCA was being vetted in Congress, a 
critical part of the process included consulting with critical legal 
stakeholders in the process, including federal judges and respected legal 
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professionals.  While on its face the legislative process appeared to be a 
showing of due diligence and bipartisanship by Congress, the political 
process still removed several controversial provisions from the JVCA.110 
Two controversial provisions in particular were removed from the 
JVCA.  The first would have allowed a plaintiff to avoid removal based on 
diversity by filing a “declaration” reducing the amount in controversy 
below the minimum specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).111  This provision 
was appealing because it offered a way of avoiding satellite litigation, 
which increases litigation costs in cases where the amount at stake is 
relatively small by the modern standard.112 
The second controversial provision cut from the JVCA focused on 
“derivative jurisdiction.”113  Several years ago, the United States Supreme 
Court articulated a rule that the jurisdiction of a district court on removal is 
“derivative:” if the state court from which a case was removed had no 
jurisdiction, the federal court also lacked jurisdiction.114  Essentially, this 
meant if a defendant removed a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, the district court is required to remand the case to the state 
court.115  This rule was revoked by Congress, and the current version of the 
abrogation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f), is limited to removals under the 
general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).116  Other removals however 
are still governed by the derivative jurisdiction rule. 
When the JVCA was introduced, it included a provision repealing the 
derivative jurisdiction rule for all removal cases, which appeared to be a 
welcomed change by federal litigators.117  However, the derivative 
jurisdiction rule was jettisoned from the bill, when the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) objected to its presence.118  Derivative jurisdiction is 
sometimes invoked by the DOJ when suits involving federal officers and 
agencies are removed to federal court.119  As such, the DOJ did not want to 
abolish derivative jurisdiction and opposition by DOJ would have stopped 
the bill in its tracks.120 
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The vetting process for the JVCA had some successes and some 
unfortunate losses of controversial provisions; if these controversial 
provisions were to have been included, it is likely the JVCA would not have 
been passed.  However, as the stated intent behind the JVCA was to provide 
clarity to federal jurisdiction, it is noteworthy that in an effort to promote 
clarity, the often-unclear political process still ruled the day. 
B. VENUE AND AMBIGUITY 
One of the more significant amendments to the JVCA was on venue.  
Partly in response to the confusion created by the 1990 Act, the JVCA 
looked to create a unitary approach to venue to help eliminate problems 
with forum-shopping and fraudulent joinder.121  Most of the amendments to 
venue have been seen as positive changes, but some ambiguities still 
remain. 
It is possible that the new amendments may create a greater incentive 
to litigate issues of venue, particularly for complex litigation cases.  28 
U.S.C. § 1391(b) now states venue is proper if civil action is brought in: 
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all 
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is 
located, or (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the 
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action, or (3) if 
there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought, 
any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s 
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.122 
These provisions, however, are prime provisions to be tested by 
litigation.  The “substantial part of the events or omissions” language 
provides much discretion to the parties to decide venue.  At first, this may 
seem attractive to litigators; however, this discretion creates an opportunity 
for creativity.  The new venue provisions may actually increase the amount 
of forum shopping particular litigants can do in a given case, and as a result, 
future federal litigants will need to carefully consider how to use these new 
venue provisions to their advantage. 
C. NEW STRATEGY CONCERNS FOR FEDERAL LITIGANTS 
The JVCA also presented new strategy concerns for federal litigants.  
Although the JVCA resolves some conflicts in the lower courts, the 
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statute’s approach is less than ideal.  It is always complicated to 
superimpose a handful of statutory procedures on a complex network of 
rules established through court decisions.123  When dealing with 
jurisdictional matters, an added challenge exists in developing procedures 
that will integrate smoothly with the great diversity of practices and 
procedures adopted by state systems for asserting and valuing claims.124 
No matter the subject area or party represented, changes will require all 
federal practice litigators to reconsider longstanding litigation strategies.125  
Specifically, federal litigation strategy for federal defendants will require 
creative and innovative approaches under the JVCA.  Under the JVCA, any 
newly added defendant has its own thirty-day time period to seek 
removal.126  This does away with plaintiffs in some circuits simply serving 
other defendants in complex litigation cases well after the first defendant in 
an attempt to run the thirty days, thus keeping the case in state court.127  The 
JVCA made significant changes litigators will want to utilize to best 
represent their clients; however, defendants should have easier access to 
federal courts.128 
V. CONCLUSION 
The JVCA, after almost a decade of discussion and debate, has 
presented some of the most expansive revisions to the judicial code since 
1990.  It has been touted by some scholars as one of the more “real” 
accomplishments by Congress; however, the JVCA is not without 
imperfections. Judge Cardozo once said, “[T]he legislature, informed only 
casually and intermittently of the needs and problems of the courts, without 
expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic advice . . . patches the 
fabric here and there, and mars often when it would mend.”129  The JVCA, 
by contrast, was prepared with extensive expert advice and makes some 
definite progress.  Even experts, however, are subject to political 
compromise.130 
The provisions of the JVCA that Congress ultimately adopted are the 
best that can be produced under the limitations of the political process.  
Because controversial proposals are dead in the water when placed in 
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legislation, it is much easier to remove the provisions than find a way to 
modify the provisions and incorporate them into the legislation.131  Yet, at 
what cost is the political process confusing, instead of clarifying, federal 
jurisdiction?  Perhaps it is time to embrace some more controversial 
reforms to restore efficiency and clarity to the federal courts and federal 
court jurisdiction. 
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